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Thanks again John for a fascinating discussion. This section was really in-depth and offered a lot of fascinating material I hadn't encountered before, and I really learned a lot--it helped to fill in the "historical" background I mentioned in section one.
There were a couple grammatical points I noticed (since you asked for this sort of feedback!): §15-you use the word "loosen" when I think you mean "loose" as in "bind and loose." I noticed this since you use "loose" in most other equivalent places (i.e. §21), so I'm assuming you had one of those annoying spell-check "corrections" that always drive me crazy! §54-In the first sentence of the seventh paragraph, there is possibly a noun missing, or the syntax is a little strange--I didn't quite understand the phrase "promoting the best we know morally and scientifically as a civilization." Later, at the end of this section, you're missing the indefinite article in the phrase "Church and State were declaring it [a] draw for the time being." These were the editorial things I noticed. I found §§34, 44, 45, and 54 all very engaging, along with the conclusion. From a more theoretical perspective, I had a couple thoughts and questions. 1. In section 45, you offer a great summary of the Reformation and its political ramifications, esp. on the fact that the so-called "religious wars" were really not religious at all but rather a ploy on the part of political authorities appropriating religion to serve their own aims of establishing state sovereignty. But then, in §54 for instance, you proceed to treat the rise of the modern secular state as offering a relief from these very "wars of religion" which were never religious in the first place! (Or if they were religious, only in the most nominal sense.) So, in §54 you write, "Weary of crusades, religious wars, and the wielding of power over them by the Church, European monarchs at first found this ‘secular’ ideology highly appealing." Well, it was the monarchs who started the wars in the first place! The European monarchs found the secular ideology appealing, I'd argue, for the very same reason they found the appropriation of religious/theological debates appealing: it offered them the chance to solidify their power and to gain more control. I'm sure you've already read William Cavanaugh on these very issues since you discuss many of the same points, but if you haven't had a chance, I'd be glad to email you a few of his best articles. 2. In your conclusion, you mention that globalization is affecting the "lives of every human being" in the world. Is this really true? It seems like there are vast numbers of people living in the world today who are not affect by globalization at all: small tribes in South America, south east Asia, and Africa, nomads in the steppes of China, Mongolia, and Siberia, etc. I suppose it depends on how you define "globalization," but it seems to me that it's not affecting nearly everyone on the globe. 3. Your methodology seems to be largely "top-down" in Part 2. You quote lots of monarchs, popes, and other politically powerful folks, but never seem to bring in any "grass-roots" movements (aside from the early stages of the Reformation, which you definitely discuss). I guess here I'm thinking of the rise of socialism in France and England as itself a very Christian development in the early nineteenth century, as well as the incredible reach of liberation theology across Latin America and into Africa in the twentieth. These seem to be quite important movements in the relationship between church and state that don't really get addressed. Perhaps (I'm not sure) such movements exemplify the seventh possibility I mentioned in my comments to part one. |
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#92
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Matt,
Thanks for grammatical corrections. You write: From a more theoretical perspective, I had a couple thoughts and questions. 1. In section 45, you offer a great summary of the Reformation and its political ramifications, esp. on the fact that the so-called "religious wars" were really not religious at all but rather a ploy on the part of political authorities appropriating religion to serve their own aims of establishing state sovereignty. But then, in §54 for instance, you proceed to treat the rise of the modern secular state as offering a relief from these very "wars of religion" which were never religious in the first place! (Or if they were religious, only in the most nominal sense.) Good question. At any time in history, power politics and religion are so commingled, or so welded together, that at the deepest level I am cautious in accounting for a "religious war" without clear political elements and a "political war" without some religion being involved. The only time I can get into a serious religious/theological argument is with close friends that have agreed to disagree! The more public they become, the more I anticipate paying a price for expressing them! No doubt Luther was a man of integrity. No doubt, at least in my mind, that the German princes were attracted to their liberation from Roman Catholic hegemony. I see, however, the state showing clear evidence of its wish to distance itself from both the Church and theological rationales for its existence and actions. In time this tension worked its way to the USA through the invocation of the creator in the Declaration of Independence, but no mention of God in the US Constitution. The first amendment to the Constitution was clearly intended to be neutral to all religions, but as we have seen, cannot avoid the tension, either. I'm sure you've already read William Cavanaugh on these very issues since you discuss many of the same points, but if you haven't had a chance, I'd be glad to email you a few of his best articles. No. I have not read Cavanaugh. Send me the articles or post them as threads here. 2. In your conclusion, you mention that globalization is affecting the "lives of every human being" in the world. Is this really true? It seems like there are vast numbers of people living in the world today who are not affect by globalization at all: small tribes in South America, south east Asia, and Africa, nomads in the steppes of China, Mongolia, and Siberia, etc. I suppose it depends on how you define "globalization," but it seems to me that it's not affecting nearly everyone on the globe. It may be that the point has been over emphasized, but not enough to invalidate it. From what I have seen, and this in anecdotal, even in many of the remotest places in the world the people show some concrete evidence of contact with the larger world around them, and must in some minimal sense deal with government. The vast majority of the people in the world, however, must face globalization. 3. Your methodology seems to be largely "top-down" in Part 2. You quote lots of monarchs, popes, and other politically powerful folks, but never seem to bring in any "grass-roots" movements (aside from the early stages of the Reformation, which you definitely discuss). I guess here I'm thinking of the rise of socialism in France and England as itself a very Christian development in the early nineteenth century, as well as the incredible reach of liberation theology across Latin America and into Africa in the twentieth. These seem to be quite important movements in the relationship between church and state that don't really get addressed. Perhaps (I'm not sure) such movements exemplify the seventh possibility I mentioned in my comments to part one. A good point. One that could be developed in order to give a more holistic picture. My only defense is that Part II is given in order to illustrate the six models set forth in Part I, and to make the case that the pattern has been set for how the Church will be dealing with the global powers in the new "one world order." I do touch on the French Revolution, though not on the size of its impact. And liberation theology has had an enormous impact, particularly in Latin America and Africa, even among the minority communities in the United States. My only insight here can be illustrated by what happened in South Africa in the aftermath of apartheid, and in the USA in the aftermath of the civil rights. Once a militant theology meant to bring about change, the question became, "What theology do we now promote for a just society now that we have power?" In a clear sense, the wilderness experience and conquest of Canaan set precedence; that is, perhaps 'we' should be writing "wilderness theology" and "just ruler" theology. Finally on this same point, it is interesting to see some of the developing perspectives in the church, particularly in Africa, that is militant against neo-liberal economics. |
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